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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
becomes an officer of the court whose duty is to exercise a high degree
of candor in all his relations with the court. The principal case has
adopted a sound policy, for, regardless of whether the petitioner was,
in fact, a member of the Communist Party,24 information regarding
his membership in the Party is clearly relevant to his fitness to
practice law.
CRIMINAL LAW-NEW TEST OF INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
Defendant, who had a long history of mental illness, was accused of
housebreaking." At the trial, his only defense was insanity at the time
the act was committed. His conviction was reversed on appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which adopted, as
a new test of insanity in that jurisdiction, the rule that "an accused
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect."2 The court retained the District's
rule that the prosecution must prove the mental responsibility of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt.3
There are two principal tests utilized in determining the insanity of
the defendant in criminal cases. In England and twenty-nine states,'
the only standard of mental responsibility is the "right-wrong" test,
made famous in M'Naghten's case,5 which absolves the defendant of
criminal responsibility if he did not "know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
24. There was no affirmative evidence in the principal case that the petitioner
had ever been a member of the Communist Party. During the investigation by
the committee, however, the petitioner had expressed his belief in the doctrine of
revolution and the right of the people to overthrow the government by force of
arms, if necessary. The court, however, based its decision upon the petitioner's
refusal to disclose whether he was a Communist, and not upon the statements
made by the petitioner during the committee's inquiry.
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1801 (1951).
2. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The test
has subsequently been rejected by the United States Court of Military Appeals.
United States V. Smith, 23 U.S.L. Week 2321 (U.S. Ct. of Mil. App. Dec. 30,
1954).
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4. See WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 51 (1954). Mis-
souri is one of these states; see State v. McGee, 361 Mo. 309, 234 S.W.2d 587
'(1950).
.5. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
Daniel M'Naghten, was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the killing of
Edward Drummond, secretary to Robert Peel, then prime minister of England.
The furor caused by the verdict, resulted in. a debate. in the House of Lords in
which leading judges in England were asked questions regarding the law with
respect to insanity. Their answers were not new law-but, were merely a recita-
tion of what the law in England was at that time., See HALL, PINCIPLES OF'
CRIMINAL LAw 480 (1947).
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was doing what was wrong."' The second principal standard is the
"irresistible impulse" test, adopted in at least fourteen jurisdictions,
which accepts the "right-wrong" standard and, in addition, excuses
the defendant from criminal responsibility if he is so mentally in-
competent as to lack the will power to resist the impulse of commit-
ting the crime.,
The new test adopted in the District of Columbia is substantially
the same as the one existing in New Hampshire since 1369' and is very
similar to the one proposed by the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment., The Commission proposal, that a defendant should not
be held responsible if "at the time of the act the accused was suffering
from disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) to such a degree that
he ought not to be held responsible,"' 0 expressly instructs the jury to
make a moral judgment as to the defendant's legal responsibility."1
While the test in the principal case does not so instruct, the court did
state that the jury, in accordance with its traditional function, should
consider whether the defendant is morally responsible. 2
Although the test adopted could be challenged on the ground that
in any situation the act could be said to be the product of a mental
disease, 3 the moral responsibility factor answers the attack because
it allows a determination of moral guilt in addition to a considera-
tion of whether the criminal act did not in fact stem from a mental
disease or defect. Also, the test has merit in that it recognizes that
the mental processes are interrelated and interdependent and not
separate and distinct. Although this recognition results in a lack
of definite legal criteria by which a jury can determine an accused's
responsibility, it is more desirable to allow the jury to supply its own
test, which stems from standards set by society, than for the court to
direct the jury to apply definite but erroneous criteria.
The principal case also deals with the procedural aspects in regard
to the issue of sanity. In all jurisdictions in the United States, there
is a presumption that the accused was sane at the time the act was
committed.24 As to the amount of evidence needed to rebut this pre-
6. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722
(H.L. 1843).
7. See WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMNAL DEFENSE 51, 52 (1954).
Professor Weihofen, in his exhaustive book on the subject, lists three other
states, Montana, New Mexico and Ohio, as possibly falling within the "irresistible
impulse" group. Rhode Island is listed as not having passed on the question.
8. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
9. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 REPORT 116 (1953).
10. Ibid. Italics added.
11. The word "ought" inserts a moral element in the test. See Williams, The
Royal Commission antd the Defence of Insanity in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1954(Keeton and Schwarzenberger ed. 1954).
12. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
13. See People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 223, 51 Pac. 329, 331 (1897).
14. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 214 (1954).
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sumption, the courts differ. In some states, the presumption is so
strong that it is not rebutted until disproved by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence.25 Until the defendant meets this
burden, which makes insanity a matter of affirmative defense, the
prosecution need not introduce evidence of sanity. In other jurisdic-
tions, the presumption of sanity requires only that the defendant
produce sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt as to his
sanity.71 At this point, the presumption of sanity drops out as a rule
of procedure and is given evidentiary weight as an inference of fact
to aid the prosecution, in producing enough evidence to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt.17
In the District of Columbia, the presumption of sanity is significant
at two different stages of the trial. As soon as the defendant intro-
duces "some evidence"' 8 of insanity, that issue becomes a jury ques-
tion,29 and the presumption drops out as a rule of procedure, becom-
ing an inference of fact which the jury must weigh against the evi-
dence of insanity ;2G however, the burden of going forward with the
evidence apparently does not shift at this point, and the mental re-
sponsibility of the accused may be proved solely by the evidentiary
weight attached to the inference of sanity. 1 If, however, the defen-
dant proceeds to produce enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt
as to his sanity, the burden of going forward with the evidence shiftsi
and the prosecution, aided by the evidentiary weight of the inference
of sanity, must then produce affirmative evidence to remove the rea-
sonable doubt=
STie court in the principal case held that, because the defendant
had met the requirement of "some evidence," the trial court, hearing
the case without a jury, was obliged to consider the issue of insanity
as a factual question.2 3 Although the decision could be construed as
also holding that the burden of going forward with the evidence
shifted at this point, the court apparently did not so hold.2' -While
15. rd. at 215. In one state, Oregon, a- statute requires that the defendant
prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26-929
(1940). This requirement has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States as not being a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
16. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DisoRDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENsE 215 (1954).
17. Id. at 217. New Hampshire is one of these states. State v. Jones, 50 N.L
369, 400 (1871).
18. The requirement of "some evidence" is very easily met, and it is sufficient
merely to produce evidence relevant to the issue of insanity. See Tatum v.
United States, 190 F.2d 612, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
19. Id. at 615.
20. Ibi
21. See Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
22. See Holloway v- United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DIsoRDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENsE 227 (1954).
23. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
24. Id. at 868, 869.
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the distinction drawn between "some evidence" and evidence sufficient
to establish a reasonable doubt does not seem realistic or practicable,
the general rule that the state must establish mental responsibility
beyond a reasonable doubt is sound in that it is consistent with the
usual rules of criminal procedure which require the prosecution to
prove all elements of its case.'
Theoretically, both in the District of Columbia, and in New Hamp-
shire,2' the prosecution has a most difficult task in obtaining a con-
viction as a result of the combination of rules that those jurisdictions
have adopted in regard to an accused's sanity and the procedure by
which it is proved: the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the unlawful act of the defendant was not the product of
a mental disease or defect. As a practical matter, however, although
it would seem that these rules will induce defendants to plead insanity
more often and thereby increase the task of the prosecution, it is
doubtful whether any serious increase in the number of verdicts for
the defendant by reason of insanity will result because of a reluctance
of juries to find an accused insane if he has committed a crime which
arouses moral indignation.?
TAXATION-EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX ON
NON-PROBATE PROPERTY
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954)
Decedent left property under a will naming his widow and two sons
residuary legatees. He also left a sizeable non-probate estate con-
sisting of an annuity contract "death benefit" payable to his widow
monthly for twenty years, with his two sons as contingent beneficia-
ries.' The widow, as executrix, charged the federal estate tax2 upon
25. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790, 802 (1952).
26. See note 17 supra.
27. See ZmBooORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT
56-68 (1954). Dr. Zilboorg refers to several cases in which the defendant would
appear to have been insane at the time of the act yet was found sane by thejury. But see also ROYAL COMWNIISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953
REPOaR 106 (1953), where witnesses reported that even the "irresistible impulse"
test had resulted in an increase in the number of verdicts of not guilty by reason
of insanity.
1. The annuity would have paid the decedent monthly amounts for life begin-
ning at age seventy; when he died at sixty-seven an alternative clause made the
principal of $128,000 payable to his widow over a twenty-year period. Calculated
upon an actuarial basis, the interest of decedent's sons in the annuity benefit was
approximately $3,000 each, yet on the basis of the widow's settlement each would
have been compelled to pay $7,000 from his share of the residuary estate as
one-third of the tax upon the entire benefit.
2. 26 U.S.C. §§ 800-939 (1952). Although there have been no decisions on
this point under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, it is believed that the effect
of the law is unchanged, since Chapter 11 (§§ 2001-2207) of the new code con-
tinues the basic provisions of the estate tax in materially unaltered form.
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